Introduction

4
Over the last several decades, risk management policies in agriculture have been significantly 5 modified. In Italy, the Fondo di Solidarietà Nazionale (FSN) was developed in the 1970s and was intended to 6 compensate farmers who had been affected by natural disasters. This policy, which has played a prominent insurance contracts (Cafiero et al., 2007) . The market for insurance in Italy is evolving rapidly and there is 9 considerable interest in understanding the operation of the program and in monitoring farmers' 10 participation over time. In fact, although the budget for the FSN has never been limited, the type of 11 available contracts and the set of subsidized policies have increased over time. At the same time, 12 participation has been stable over time.
13
Policymakers often act to encourage participation in crop insurance programs, most often through 14 the use of large subsidies. However, such promotion requires an understanding of participation as well as 15 entry and exit decisions. We investigate the demand for crop insurance using individual models of 16 participation, entry and exit decisions. We seek to inform policymakers by providing an understanding of 17 the determinants of turnover in insurance markets that may affect participation in crop insurance 18 programs.
19
Contracts that cover losses from multiple risks have also increased in prominence around the up to 80% to insure a farm's production against losses larger than thirty percent of the historical average 24 level of production. In the EU, empirical evidence on the effects of subsidies on participation rates in 25 insurance programs is not clear (Garrido and Zilberman, 2008; Finger and Lehmann, 2012) , and their effects 26 are often debated (see, for example, Bakhshi and Gray, 2012; and Di Falco et al., 2014) . The Italian case is of 1 particular interest for a number of reasons. Participation is low despite the Italian government's subsidy 2 being one of the highest in world (cfr. Mahul and Stutley, 2010) . In Italy the vast majority of contracts are 3 purchased by farms located in Northern Italy rather than in other parts of the country (European 4 Commission, 2009; Enjolras et al., 2012) . This is a consequence of the structure of insurance premium rates 5 in the North, where the typical loss ratio (the ratio of indemnity payments to premiums) is closer to unity.
6
In contrast, the southern part of Italy has a loss ratio of about one half. While greater insurance returns to 7 farmers may well explain greater participation in the north than in other regions, geographically-distinct 8 farmers also face different sources of risk. Moreover, insurance contracts are far from being widely 9 adopted as a stable tool of risk management in Italy. We observe that few farms carry insurance for more 10 than two consecutive years. Understanding the factors underlying this high turnover rate has important 11 implications for the operation of the programs since, despite large subsidies, participation in crop insurance 12 is both limited and volatile. In order to increase participation it is important not only to stimulate entry but 13 also to encourage insurance renewal and thus inhibit exits from the program. The determinants of these 14 decisions have not been yet fully explored.
15
The demand for crop insurance in U.S. has received significant empirical attention in a large 16 number of empirical studies (e.g. Goodwin, 1993, Goodwin and Smith, 2013; Skees and Reed, 1986; Smith 17 and Goodwin, 1996; Sherrick et al. 2004) . Goodwin (1993) shows that land size, land value, and a corporate 18 farm structure have positive effects on insurance demand. Coble et al. (1997) conclude that the higher the 19 expected return to insurance, the higher the adoption rate. Education, farm experience, debt and disaster 20 payments have also been shown to be associated with the adoption of crop insurance (Goodwin and 21 Kastens, 1993; Smith Baquet, 1996) 2 .
22
The empirical literature on crop insurance in EU Countries is also rich, though turnover has not 23 been explicitly investigated. An important analysis by Garrido and Zilberman (2008) shows that premium 24 subsidies are the leading factor that increases the probability of using insurance in Spain. In contrast, Finger 25 and Lehmann (2012) show that support to farmers' incomes tends to decrease insurance adoption rates in Switzerland. Cabas et al. (2008) model the entry and exit decisions using panel data consisting of the total 1 number of insured and uninsured farmers at the county level. They find that insured farmers are more 2 sensitive than uninsured farmers to changes in the preceding year's yield. Moreover, participation is 3 positively related to yield variability, entry and exit decisions are, respectively, positively and negatively 4 affected. Their analysis of entry and exit decisions at an aggregate level provides an interesting benchmark.
5
In an empirical study of insurance participation in France, Enjoras and Sentis (2011) show that the highest 6 risk farms are more likely to purchase insurance. They also note that the existing empirical literature has 7 largely focused on studies of aggregated data and highlight the potential importance of farm-level analyses.
8
A limited number of studies have analyzed the demand for crop insurance in Italy. Exploring the 9 demand for insurance in Italy provides useful insights into policy interventions in Europe as a whole. In fact, 10 lacking a common framework, European member states have autonomously adopted national policies for 11 assisting farmers in dealing with production risks and natural disasters. These policy interventions, typically 12 in the form of subsidies on crop insurance or agricultural solidarity funds, have been primarily adopted in 13 the Southern EU countries (France, Greece, Italy and Spain). In contrast, public intervention in the United
14
States and Canada aims at supporting farmers' management activities in a very broad sense by supporting 15 farmers' revenue through hedge funds, revenue insurance programs, mutual funds, and weather indexes 3 .
16
More important is the fact that the determinants of turnover (adopting and dropping coverage) have been 17 given scant attention in the literature. The analysis conducted by Cabas et al. (2008) aims at filling this gap.
18
However, the authors analyzed the phenomenon at an aggregate level, whereas we explicitly model farm- Detailed summaries of these plans are provided by Knight and Coble (1997) , Coble and Dismukes (2007), and Capitanio (2010 Our analysis does not explicitly model turnover, but it provides insights on how farmers' entry and exit decisions are influenced by several factors. For a broader discussion of turnover in the agricultural, financial and other sectors, the interested reader may refer to Bottazziet al.(2011 ), Cefis and Marsili (2012 ), and Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013 . 5 Recent findings suggest that governments may use agricultural disaster relief payments as a political tool to favor their core supporters (Chang and Zilberman, 2014) . Strengthening participation in insurance programs maybe economically more efficient.
relates to the time lags between the occurrence of the damaging events and compensation. These 1 weaknesses have pushed policymakers to shift the bulk of the FSN to subsidies on crop insurance. Finally, under the current legislation farmers are allowed to create mutual funds in favor of specific 12 crops and structures that are not included in the annual insurance plan. The payments from these funds are 13 made only in the event of losses greater than thirty percent of total production. In particular, the subsidy is up to 80% of the cost of premium for policies against damages (reaching at least 30% of assured production) caused by adverse weather conditions and other natural disasters, and it is up to 50% of the cost of the premium if the insurance contract also covers other losses caused by adverse weather conditions that are not considered to be widespread natural disasters, or losses caused by animal or plant diseases.
Moreover, in recent years the loss ratio has been consistently below unity, such that the amount of 1 premium collected, plus subsidies, largely exceed the indemnities paid to farmers. Such a trend seriously 2 questions the need for the current elevated level of subsidy. Significant geographical heterogeneity has also 3 characterized the program. In 2011, almost eighty percent of contracts were taken by farmers located in 4 Northern Italy (Table 2) .
5
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
6
For an individual farmer, the functioning of the program involves insurers, regional specialists, and 7 experts. A farmer that takes a contract with one of the existing insurance companies is protected against 8 losses that exceed 30% of historical production, as determined and verified by regional specialists. In particular we refer to the gradual elimination of subsidies due to the CAP reform that lead to decoupled payments (except for few products). The reform has fully changed farmers' crop choices from a pro-subsidy view to a pro-market one. Such a change has exposed farmers to major risks, and has led policymakers to design government interventions to support crop insurance and mutual funds as stabilization tools. entering(exiting) is greater than the expected utility of not entering (not exiting).
Our empirical investigation is conducted through a variety of probit models. Our first specification 7 assesses participation in crop insurance programs, which is modeled as a time-varying binary variable 8 representing the discrete insurance participation decision. The remaining models consider entry and exit in 9 the insurance program. In particular, the entry and exit decisions are modeled using two dichotomous 10 variables. The variable "entry" is equal to one if the farmer was not insured in time t-1, but purchased an 11 insurance contract in time t. The model is estimated only for those observations for which the variable
12
"insurance" had value equal to zero at time t-1. This model considers all farmers that were not insured and 13 thus explains why some uninsured farmers purchased insurance in time t, while others did not. The variable
14
"exit" is equal to one if the farmer purchased insurance in time t-1 and did not purchase insurance in time
15
t. This model is estimated only for those farmers that were insured in time t-1. These models allow us to 16 focus on the entry and exit decisions individually and thus permit farm and operator characteristics to have 17 different effects on the entry and exit decisions
10
.
18
In order to take into account for the panel nature of our dataset, we condition on unobserved 19 effects in estimation using the methods outlined by Wooldridge (2002):
where the first equality states that the explanatory variables are exogenous, conditional on unobserved 22 effects ( ) so that the unobserved effects can be excluded from the RHS. The assumption allows us to omit 23 lagged variables. The second equality is the standard assumption of probit models. We adopt a random 24 effects (RE) probit estimators and a fixed effects (FE) for each model ( = participation, entry, exit covariates ( , ) to capture the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity ( ) and the covariates.
8
The resulting specification is estimated as a random effects model:
where
The three probit models consider the insurance participation decision, the decision
11
of an uninsured farmer in t-1 to enroll in the program (entry) in time t, and the decision of an insured 12 farmer in time t-1 to drop coverage in time t (exit). This approach implies that the entry and exit models are 13 estimated on subsets of the entire sample. 11 We suspect that exogenous factors may have different 14 influences on entry and exit decisions and thus our specification allows for such differences.
15
Several control variables that are conceptually relevant to the insurance decisions are considered.
16
We include the entrepreneur's main characteristics (I), such as age, sex and level of education, and 17 structural variables (II) related to the farms' location, organization and farming systems
12
. We also consider 18 financial factors (III) reflected in a farm's capital, financial leverage, and other relevant financial variables.
19
Finally, we include two variables related to parameters of the insurance programs (IV) and two alternative 20 risk management strategies 13 (V).
21
11 As suggested by a referee, given our 4 year panel data and because entry/exit equations are independent it seems more appropriate to stress once more that we are modeling entry and exit decisions, whereas complete turnover (i.e. entry-exit-entry) is not directly modeled in our framework. 12 An anonymous referee has noted that insurance decisions may be affected by crop rotation choices. We essentially assume that crop choice decisions are pre-determined relative to the insurance decision in that modeling the endogeneity of crop choice decisions would require a different econometric strategy and is beyond the scope of the present analysis. The interested reader may refer to Lacroix and Thomas (2011) and Carpentier and Letort (2012) for recent applications considering these issues. 13 Understanding how farmers cope with risks by adopting alternative strategies such as irrigation and crop diversification is an important issue. Recent studies suggest that farmers, on average, are risk averse and adopt premium provides a valid representation of expected premia for all farms of a given type and in a specific 10 region. As noted, farms are quite heterogeneous. For example, large variation is observed in farms' capital, 11 cultivated areas and numbers of crops across the sample (Table 3) .
12
In order to investigate decisions of exit or entry with respect to changes in selected strategies small farms as well as insurance agents and companies that service these small farms which thereby can be 15 expected to limit participation.
16
The "Expected Loss Ratio" is statistically significant in the participation and exit models. However, investigate this further, we included the interaction terms of "Expected Loss Ratio" and regional dummies.
21
We find a negative correlation with the entry decision for Northeast and Northwest, and a positive Analyzing these issues is beyond the scope of the present analysis and data and is left as an important item for future research.
damage (Enjolras et al., 2012) . In all other cases either the expected sign is either confirmed or the 1 variables are not statistically significant. A limitation of our variable is that it is constructed only from 2 insured farmers, for which we observe data on indemnities and premiums. As shown by Just et al. (1999) , 3 loss ratios may be significantly higher for insured than for non-insured farmers due to adverse selection.
4
We interacted the variable "Expected Premia" with dummies for geographical location (Northwest, 5 Northeast, Center and South) in order to control for heterogeneity at the regional level: therefore the is likely that risk is more homogeneous within macro-regions than between macro-regions. The approach is 8 similar to that followed by Goodwin (1993) . We find that the higher the expected premium, the lower the 9 participation in Northwest and Center. Conversely, in "Northeast" the higher is the expected premium, the 10 greater is participation in insurance programs. The results are not surprising considering that "Expected
11
Premia" is lower in the Northeast, while participation is very significant. The combination of higher 12 premiums and lower loss ratios in the "Northeast" suggest that exposure to systemic risk (Miranda and
13
Glauber, 1997) may be an issue for this particular region, where apple and grape production is prevalent. In 14 fact, the indemnities paid in the "Northeast" are three to eight times as large as in the rest of Italy (Table 2) .
15
As a result, the higher is the "Expected Premia" (which reflects a higher level of underlying risk), the higher 16 is the participation in crop insurance program. area, the lower is the probability of adopting insurance for farms that are uninsured.
7
"Irrigation" is statistically significant in the participation model, and is not statistically significant for 8 entry and exit decisions. Participation varies in a positive manner with irrigation, suggesting that increases 9 in irrigation tend to be associated with a higher probability of participation in insurance programs. Foudi
10
and Erdlenbruch (2012) found that irrigation technology serves as self-insurance in that buying "insurance 11 decreases the probability of adopting irrigation", p.454. The coefficient for "Decrease in irrigated area" is 12 statistically significant, and negative, in the model of the entry decision, indicating that uninsured farms (at 13 t-1) that reduce their irrigation systems (in time t-1) are less likely to sign up for insurance (in time t). insurance, a factor that also tends to favor entry into the insurance program.
25
16 Farmers that increase diversification are more likely to exit. This result is statistically significant in one specification at the 10% level. Farmers that decrease the irrigated area are less likely to enter in the insurance market.
It is important to evaluate the role of insurance premia on dynamics in insurance markets. In 1 "Northwest", "Center" and "South" high insurance premia tend to lower the probability of entry by 2 uninsured farmers, and to increase the probability of exit by insured farmers
17
. Though not always 3 statistically significant, the results tend to suggest that the demand for insurance is downward sloping with 4 respect to premia, a result consistent with adversely selected participants in crop insurance programs in 5 that the larger the premium the lower the attractiveness of the contract. 
Concluding Remarks
8
We consider three important aspects of the decision to insure crops in Italy. These include the 9 question of participation, and also the decisions to enter and to exit from an insurance scheme. We discuss the signs of the coefficients, but it is worth noting that in many cases the coefficients are statistically not significant: for example the variables "E[premia]*Northeast", "E[premia]*Center", and "E[premia]*South" are statistically not significant in the entry decision equation (column 2, table 5).
that farm and operator characteristics differ across those farmers that enter and exit crop insurance 1 schemes, policies intended to support participation may take different approaches for farmers that are 2 already insured than for farmers that do not currently insure. Targeted technical support is usually 3 recommended to enhance the participation in agricultural insurance programs (Mahul and Stutley, 2010) .
4
For example, education and outreach programs may adopt different approaches toward encouraging 5 insured farmers to maintain coverage than what might be optimal in encouraging uninsured farmers to 6 enroll in insurance programs.
7
We find that education and farm size are determinants of participation in insurance markets, al., 2012, among others. Our analysis also explicitly models the entry and exit decisions at the farm level.
10
We find that entry and exit decision are driven by different factors and that adjustments to changes may 11 reflect asymmetric patterns of adjustment, with increases in key variables implying different adjustments 12 that would be the case for corresponding decreases. Our results are consistent with previous studies in this 13 regard (see, for example, Smith and Goodwin, 1996; and Singerman et al., 2012) . The negative correlation 14 that we found for crop diversification (and irrigated area) in the participation equation suggests that 15 farmers tend to adopt crop diversification (and irrigation) and insurance contracts as alternate risk 16 management strategies. These factors are certainly alternative mechanisms for managing risk and thus 17 would be expected to serve as substitutes for insurance participation.
18
A few caveats are relevant to this study. First, our data were collected over a four year period. This 19 reflects that fact that our focus on entry and exit decisions required observing individual farms over 20 multiple periods. We thus included only those farms continuously observed during the period. Although 21 we rely on a large set of data made up of more than three-thousand farms, our results do not capture more 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 Online Appendix -Not intended for publication 1 2 We have compared two estimators: RE and the FE (as per Mundlak (1978 ), cfr. Greene, 2008 . We 
13
For the participation model, we report several estimates to show how we have proceeded to select the 14 final model and the appropriate estimator. We included fixed time effects, eliminated the delta variables,
15
and dropped the "Vegetable revenue" variable (to assess if the potential collinearity with "Cultivated area" 16 is an issue. We report the selected model in the last column of table A.
18
For the entry and exit models, the RE estimator is preferred. The estimates are not significantly different 
